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I. THE PROBLEM: THE NONPROFIT HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY
AS A FACTOR IN THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS
A. The Delivery of Health Care Service: Some Background
To quote from the recently published book Blue Cross: What
Went Wrong?, "The crisis in medical care has arrived as an Ameri-
can public issue,"' and current statistics reveal why this is so. Health
care costs have been increasing much faster than the rate of inflation
generally. 2 Public attention has been focused on this increase as more
and more people begin to feel that the sharp rise in the price of health
care has brought with it no commensurate rise in the quality of health
care.3 While Americans in fiscal 1973 spent $94.1 billion (7.7 percent
of the gross national product) on health and medical care,4 Americans
in low and lower-middle income brackets continue to receive thor-
oughly inadequate health care.'
* Member of the Ohio Bar
** Third Year Student, Yale University School of Law
S. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1974); see generally E. KENNEDY, IN
CRITICAL CONDITION: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE (1972); [OHIO] GOVERNOR'S
TASK FORCE ON HEALTH CARE, FINAL REPORT (1973) [hereinafter cited as OHIO TASK FORCE].
I M. FELDSTEIN, THE RISING COST OF HOSPITAL CARE 10-13 (1971). In fiscal 1973, the
average health bill for each person was $441; in 1960, it was $142; in 1950, it was less than $80.
This growth was two and one-half times as great as the increase in wage levels over the same
period. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93d CONG., 2d SEss., NATIONAL HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE RESOURCE BOOK 8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as RESOURCE BOOK]. Indeed, projections
are that spending on health care services will rise at an annual rate of 8.5 percent throughout
the seventies, reaching more than $i 13 billion by 1975 and almost $165 billion by 1980. BUREAU
OF DOMESTIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK
1975 AT 399 (1972) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK].
' See M. MOOREHEAD, A STUDY OF THE QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE SECURED BY A
SAMPLE OF TEAMSTER FAMILY MEMBERS IN NEW YORK CITY (1964); see E. Jancura, The
Economic Implications of the Use of Labor Resources by Hospitals, 1972 (unpublished doc-
toral dissertation in Case Western Reserve University Library) at 68:
The concept of hospital quality is one filled with vague standards, unmeasurable
values and just plain disagreement. . . .There is not even agreement whether quality
of care has improved or deteriorated.
Id. at 6.
A. SOMERS, HEALTH CARE IN TRANSITION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE ch. 4 (1971).
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A country that can spend $94.1 billion a year on health care' can
hardly be said to be lacking in economic resources to solve the prob-
lem of providing health care to all its citizens. Commentators gener-
ally describe the problem as one not of lack of resources but of
massive inefficiency, or of misallocation of existing resources.
Herbert Denenberg, a former Commissioner of the Pennsylvania
Department of Insurance and a noted critic of the insurance industry,
sums up these observations: "Almost all of the problems surrounding
our present health delivery system rest on one point. That is the
misallocation of our scarce resources in delivering health care.' 7
Professor Sylvia Law of New York University Law School, author
of Blue Cross: What Went Wrong?, states that "it is widely ac-
knowledged that-the American health care crisis is primarily one of
organization, administration, and accountability." 8
The recently released report of the Ohio Governor's Task Force
on Health Care pointed to the reason underlying the misallocation
problem:
The health care market is unique in that it is neither wholly a
competitive market, nor is it a regulated market. As a result, re-
sponsibility for promoting cost containment in inducing efficiency
is diffuse and fragmented. This has led to an upward bias on cost
which, in turn, has promoted practices that feed inflation.
The cost spiral in health care generally is particularly acute in
the area of hospital costs. Hospital care absorbs a much higher per-
centage of the health care dollar than any other health service, signifi-
cantly more than costs of physicians and dental services combined.'
Moreover, while the costs of all phases of health care services have
increased, it is the cost of hospital care that has risen the most
rapidly.1 Hospital insurance premiums are keeping pace; for exam-
ple, the increases granted Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New
Particularly insightful is this comment by Ms. Somers: "[A]mong people age 25 to 64 who die,
some 45 to 50 percent have neither hospital nor surgical coverage." Id. at 46. See E. KENNEDY,
supra note 1.
I This was the figure for 1973. RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 6.
7 PA. COMM'R OF INSURANCE, GUIDELINES FOR INCLUSION IN BLUE CROSS CONTRACT
WITH DELAWARE VALLEY HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION AND RESPONSE OF BLUE CROSS (1973).
S. LAW, supra note 1, at 2.
OHIO TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 104.
10 In fiscal 1973, hospital care coot Americans $36.2 billion-a 10.7 percent increase from
1972-while they paid a combined $23.4 billion for the services of physicians and dentists, up
8.5 and 6.7 percent, respectively. RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 12.
1 Betv. en 1967 and 1972, the consumer price index for all items rose twenty-five percent,
and costs of medical care rose thirty-three percent, while costs for hospital care rose seventy-
four percent OHIO TASK FORCE, supra note 1.
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York for hospital insurance subscribers has been 16.8% in 1975,.7.4%
in 1973, 14.8% in 1972, and 17.8% in 1971.11.1 Nationwide, a single
day spent in the hospital today costs almost five hundred percent as
much as a single day ten years ago.12 This price rise is not due primar-
ily to higher wages paid to hospital employees, as some care providers
have intimated; researchers have pointed out that the ratio of labor
expenditures to total expenditures in a hospital may actually be de-
clining. 13 Rather, the health insurance industry itself is a major cause
of hospital cost increases.
The financing which the health insurance industry provides for
health care is heavily concentrated in payments for hospital care."
Whereas the industry meets only about one fourth of all private
health care costs, it provides over three fourths of the money consum-
ers spend on hospital care. This statistic indicates the enormous im-
pact which the health insurance industry can have on hospital costs.
There has also been a rapid growth in the number of health
insurance plans. 5 By the end of 1972 about eighty percent of Ameri-
cans under sixty-five years of age had some form of health insur-
ance. 6 In this rapidly expanding industry, Blue Cross plays a vital
role.
"' New York Times, Feb. 20, 1975 at 1.
,i Hearing Before Ohio Dep't of Insurance, In re Application for Rate Adjustment by Blue
Cross of Lima, Ohio 294, 312 (Dec. 19-20, 1973) (testimony of Sylvia A. Law, on file at Ohio
Department of Insurance) [hereinafter cited as Lira, OHIO HEARINGS]; see RESOURCE BOOK,
supra note 2, at 22-23.
"1 See E. Jancura, supra note 3, at 77. Professor Jancura, citing H.G. Lewis's finding
that "the majority of workers have been employed in industries whose average relative wages
have been raised or lowered by unionism by no more than 4 per cent," seems to conclude in
general that unionization of hospital workers is not an overriding factor in the huge increases
in hospital costs. See RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 22-23.
In fact, wages for hospital employees have long lagged far behind that of wages for
comparable work in industry. See, e.g., Kochery and Strauss, The Nonprofit Hospital and the
Union, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 255 (1960); Vladeck, Collective Bargaining in Voluntary Hospitals
and Other Nonprofit Operations, 19TH ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR, at 222
(Christensen, Ed. 1967). A few years ago it was revealed that 37 percent of hospital employees
at a major Cleveland hospital were forced to apply to the county welfare department for
financial aid for their families. Billington, Hospitals, Unions and Strikes, 18 CLaV. MAR. L.
Rav. 70, 73 (1969). Until recently hospital employees lacked the protection of national labor
legislation. The Taft-Hartley Act, through the Tydings Amendment, exempted nonprofit hospi-
tals from coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Congress removed this exemption in 1974. P.L. 93-
360.
1" While health insurance benefits cover only twenty-six percent of total private consumer
expenditures for health care, the benefits cover seventy-nine percent of all private consumer
expenditures for health care. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1973 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 69 (1973).
Is For a quick summary of the history of health insurance plans through the 1950's, see
Simpson, Nonprofit Hospital Plans, 8 CLEv.-MAtR.L.REv. 492 (1959). Simpson states that the
modem concept of prepayment first became widespread in the 1930's. For a more extensive
summary of the history up till the present, see S. LAw, supra note 1.
"1 RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 74-75. The scope and breadth of coverage varied.
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Professor Law, in testimony at hearings on Blue Cross, stated
that "Blue Cross stands in probably the most powerful position of the
various institutions that make up the health care system in the
country," and that "Blue Cross is perhaps the pivotal institution in
the delivery of health care services in this country."17
The rationale of such strong statements can be explained as
follows. As discussed above, hospital care accounts for the lion's
share of the health care dollar. In Ohio and other states where Blue
Cross has heavy market penetration, Blue Cross provides a typical
hospital with approximately fifty percent of its revenues'L-with
about half of these revenues paid to the hospital by Blue Cross for
provider services for subscribers and the remaining half paid by Blue
Cross in its role as "intermediary" for government funds (mainly
Medicare and Medicaid)." In some cases, Blue Cross has been known
to administer up to seventy percent of the income of hospitals of an
area." The role of Blue Cross is so crucial that Professor Law has
stated that "it has the power, if [it] had the will, to turn around the
health care crisis.' '12
This article suggests that the rapid rise in hospital costs is owing
primarily to the largely unregulated contractual and economic rela-
tionship between Blue Cross 2 organizations and their member hospi-
As those sixty-five years of age and older have protection through medicare, the statistics for
this age bracket are less relevant.
" LIMA, OHIO, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 291.
" Although Blue Cross now trails the sum total of all commercial insurers combined (it
has about thirty-five percent of the under sixty-five private consumer market and all commer-
cial about fifty-seven percent), Blue Cross has recently regained its position of market domi-
nance as intermediary for medicare and medicaid. S. LAW, supra note 1, at 2.
11 Id. at ch. 2. The term "intermediary" is explained in the RESOURCE BOOK, supra note
2, at 429, as describing the function of Blue Cross under medicare:
The Medicare program is under the overall direction of the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare. Within the department, the Bureau of Health Insurance of
the Social Security Administration is responsible for policy and administrative con-
trol the program, with much of the day-to-day operational work of the program
performed under contract by 132 commercial insurance companies and Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans. These organizations have the responsibility as intermedi-
aries between the government and the provider for reviewing claims for benefits and
making payments. . . .Under the hospital insurance part of the program, groups
or associations of providers, on behalf of their members, nominate a public or private
agency or organization to serve as intermediary in the claims process.
Id. at 432. Oftentimes Blue Cross is the nominee.
11 This is true, for example, of Blue Cross of Lima, Ohio. See LIMA, OHIO, HEARINGS,
supra note 12, at 106.
21 Id. at 291.
" The origin and development of the term "Blue Cross" is documented in S. LAW, supra
note 1, at 11:
The name "Blue Cross" and the Blue Cross insignia were owned by the Ameri-
can Hospital Asso~iation [AHA] until 1972. . . .In 1936, as part of the AHA effort
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tals. This relationship, in fact, goes to the heart of the cost crisis in
the delivery of health care services, and, as shown above, Blue Cross
is the primary purchaser of hospital services.
The major national health insurance bills presently in Congress
do nothing to deprive Blue Cross of its critical position in health care
services. Thus some authorities suggest that, unless the relationship
between Blue Cross and member hospitals is made the object of
effective regulation by the states, most proposed national health in-
surance plans will simply fuel the sources of the present inflation in
hospital costs. As a consequence, national health insurance premiums
may rise so sharply that in the near future health care insurance may
be as unaffordable as health care itself is today.3 It is the object of
this article to discuss the inflationary effect of the relationship be-
tween Blue Cross and the hospitals, to examine the procedures avail-
able to the states to regulate the relationship and the goals states
might pursue when using these procedures, and to explore the ration-
ale underlying the use of each of these procedures.
B. Inflationary Practices of Blue Cross
Blue Cross and Blue Shield 4 are provider-sponsored plans which
offer free choice of hospital and doctor and furnish mainly "service
benefits. ' ' " Two other major types of health insurance plans exist. 6
to promote the establishment of prepaid hospitalization plans, it created a Commit-
tee on Hospital Services, which, in 1946, became the Blue Cross Commission of the
AHA. Until 1960 the Commission performed the national coordinating function
among Blue Cross plans. In 1960 most of the functions of the Blue Cross Commis-
sion were transferred to the Blue Cross Association [BCA], a non-profit Illinois
corporation. The BCA and AHA maintained close coordination through interlock-
ing directorates, with the AHA designating three members of the Blue Cross board
and BCA designating two members to the board of the Hospital Association. Other
functions, including the administration of the approval program for the use of the
Blue Cross insignia, were retained by the AHA. In 1971 the AHA and Blue Cross
agreed in principle that the ownership of the Blue Cross name and insignia should
be transferred from the AHA to the BCA. . . The organizations also agreed to
eliminate the interlocking directorate and substitute a joint committee to facilitate
communication between the two groups.
13 See generally, Hearing Before Ohio Dep't of Insurance, In re Adoption of Rule IN-
1739.01 (June 26, 1974) (testimony of Sylvia A. Law on file at Ohio Department of Insurance)
[hereinafter cited as Ohio Rule Hearings].
11 Of the two major provider plans, Blue Cross is by far the larger; its annual income is
about 2.5 times that of Blue Shield. A. SOMERS, supra note 5, at 49.
2 The term "service benefits" describes a system whereby, in return for advance premium
payments to the provider-sponsored plan, a hospital or doctor participating in the plan will
provide specified medical or hospital services to the subscriber on a fee-for-service basis and
will be paid directly by the plan.
25 ROEMER, HEALTH INSURANCE EFFECTS: SERvIcES, EXPENDITURES, AND ATTrrUDES
UNDER THREE TYPES OF PLANS 1 (1972).
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Commercial insurance companies offer health care insurance policies
featuring free choice of provider, under which the company directly
indemnifies the subscriber for all or part of the fees paid by him to
obtain specified medical services (though some companies have re-
cently begun to provide service benefits). In addition, there are pre-
paid plans offering services to subscribers directly through a group
medical practice organization in return for fixed monthly payments
to the organization, with no fee-for-service charges to either the sub-
scriber or the plan.? This last plan is commonly referred to as HMO,
for Health Maintenance Organization, and it in effect "means near-
total medical care for a fixed monthly fee. '28
A thorough study comparing the three types of health insurance
plans was recently released. 2 The study, which sent questionnaires to
subscribers to each type of plan in Los Angeles County, California,
brought out the following facts: (a) The average stay for a patient in
a hospital was 4.9 days per year for HMO subscribers, while it was
7.4 and 8.5 days per year for subscribers of provider-sponsored and
commercial plans, respectively; (b) hospital admissions were almost
fifty percent higher in the provider-sponsored plans than in the com-
mercial or HMO plans; (c) the percent of families with no visits to a
doctor over a three-month period was lowest for HMO subscribers;
(d) consumer dissatisfaction was lowest among HMO subscribers and
highest among the subscribers of the provider-sponsored plans; and
(e) total expenditures per family per year, including both premiums
and out-of-pocket expenses, was $323 for HMO, $364 for commer-
cial, and $447 for provider-sponsored plans."
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that HMO's make a better
use of resources than the other two plans. Other reports indicate a
similar conclusion.3' The apparent reason for this greater efficiency
is that because the HMO's base "provider reimbursement on a capi-
tation32 instead of a fee-for-service basis, a greater incentive exists
to control cost. '3 3 People spend less time in the hospital, and there
is a heavier emphasis on ambulatory services.34 Nor do the studies
2 Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84
HARV. L. REV. 887 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Role of Prepaid] gives a complete explanation
of prepaid health insurance.
21 BusINESS WEEK, January 12, 1974, at 58.
2 ROEMER, supra note 26.
3 Id.
1: Role of Prepaid, supra note 27, at 933; OHIo TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 111.
31 '"Under this compensation scheme, the medical group partnership is provided an
amount of money equal to a fixed per capita sum for each subscriber multiplied by the number
of subscribers enrolled." Role of Prepaid, supra note 27, at 907.
3 OHIo TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at I11.
u ROEMER, supra note 26, at 34.
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indicate that HMO's provide a lower standard of care,35 although
they may cause weakening of the traditional doctor-patient relation-
ship. 6
In contrast to the apparent efficiency of the HMO's, Blue Cross
has been criticized as having an insurance system in which old ineffi-
ciencies are preserved and new ones created. Several characteristics
of the contractual relationship between Blue Cross and member hos-
pitals have freed hospitals from the necessity of controlling costs and
thus are among the prime causes of the steep rise in hospital costs. 37
The first of these inflationary practices is that traditionally Blue
Cross has reimbursed member hospitals at one hundred percent or
more of the hospitals' "reasonable costs" incurred in treating Blue
Cross subscribers.38 One type of reimbursement contract used by
Blue Cross calls for a flat one hundred percent cost reimbursement,
the inflationary tendencies of which are obvious. 3'
Another typical contract calls for reimbursement by Blue Cross
to a hospital of ninety-seven percent of what it charges a subscriber
for the care he receives or 108 percent of what it costs the hospital
to treat the subscriber, whichever is less." At first glance it might
seem that the ability of Blue Cross to purchase care at three percent
3 Role of Prepaid, supra note 27, at 933; ROEMER, supra note 26. HMO's have not yet
experienced the rapid growth predicted for them, allegedly due in part to "consumer igno-
rance," in part to bureaucratic slowdowns in Washington, and in part to "nonaggressive sales-
manship" by HMO advocates. Wall St. Journal, Feb. 11, 1975, at 1.
m Role of Prepaid, supra note 27, at 939-41. The HMO plans, however efficient they may
appear from a statistical viewpoint, occupy only a very small part of the health insurance
market (about five percent, according to SOMERS, supra note 5, at 53). But this may change
rapidly in the near future. Congress recently passed P.L. 93-222, which provides $365 million
over the next two to five years for grants and loans to HMO's and for research and education
programs about HMO's. Congress in effect endorsed the HMO concept and is taking action
to encourage more participation in the plans. See generally, RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at
80-81.
" E.g., LIMA, OHIO, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 306 (statement of Sylvia Law).
m E. Jancura, supra note 3, states at 15-16:
The policy of reimbursing hospitals for their costs produces little or no pressure on
individual hospitals to attempt to hold their costs down. Installation of sophisticated
equipment and provision of specialized services, for example, are frequently moti-
vated by their prestige value without regard to the increase in costs which they
occasion.
Except for the rather intangible influence of unfavorable comparison to
industry-wide average costs, there is no pressure to force hospitals to control their
costs. The desire for prestige when unchecked by the need to control costs can often
lead to the expensive expansion of facilities when there is insufficient demand to use
them at their lowest cost.
11 See, e.g., Stark County Inter-Hospital Agency Agreement (effective January 1, 1959)
(on file at Ohio Department of Insurance).
0 See, e.g., Inter-Hospital Agency Contract (Lima, Ohio) (as amended Dec. 17, 1969) (on
file at Ohio Department of Insurance).
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less than the cost to a patient not insured by Blue Cross is an eco-
nomic advantage to Blue Cross subscribers. Also at first glance, the
ninety-seven percent-of-charges/108 percent-of-cost formula seems
like a cost-control device since it keeps hospitals from charging more
for care of a patient than what it costs.
However, an analysis of the curious way in which Blue Cross and
the hospitals define the term "reasonable cost" shows that the for-
mula does nothing to control hospital costs and in fact may act as a
spur to them. Professor Law points out that the "reasonable cost"
of treating a patient may include that patient's pro rata share of
numerous items only remotely related to patient care, such as a hospi-
tal's lobbying and public relations expenses, depreciation on new
facilities donated to the hospital by local philanthropy, and a two
percent surcharge (meaning that a hospital can charge Blue Cross two
percent more for the care of a patient than the one hundred percent-
of-cost reimbursement formula would otherwise call for)." The inclu-
sion of these items results from allowing Blue Cross and the Ameri-
can Hospital Association to define for themselves the term "reasona-
ble cost." These organizations made "no effort . ..to determine
whether total hospital costs, or any component thereof, were reasona-
ble in amount according to some market standard."4 No matter how
cost is defined, the fact that hospitals can customarily "charge" pa-
tients less for care than it "costs" shows that the term "cost" is used
by Blue Cross and hospitals in a way that has little in common with
normal business usage.
Contracts between Blue Cross and member hospitals may fur-
ther undermine the cost-consciousness of the latter by making Blue
Cross subservient to the hospitals. Language from the reimbursement
contract between Canton (Ohio) Blue Cross and its member hospitals
is typical:
The Participating Hospitals and each of them appoint Blue
Cross to be their exclusive agent to carry out and administer the
program for furnishing hospital services contemplated by this agree-
ment; to procure subscribers; to collect fees to be paid for Service
Contracts; to distribute among hospitals the funds so collected in
the manner and at the times herein provided and to do any and all
acts and things necessary in connection with or incidental to the
1t See S. LAW, supra note 1, at 110-15; see also LIMA, OHIo, HEARINGS, supra note 12, at
288-91.
42 Id. at 91.
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carrying out of this agreement, which appointment shall be irrevoc-
able during the participation of such hospital in this agreement."
At best, such contract provisions tend to divide Blue Cross' loyalties,
which accounts for the traditional unwillingness of Blue Cross to
examine critically hospital construction," hospital admissions, 5
length of hospital stay,4" and other crucial aspects of hospital opera-
tions that determine the level of health care efficiency.
A brief comparison of the approaches of HMO's and Blue Cross
to the problem of the construction of excessive hospital bed capacity
will demonstrate the costliness of the unwillingness of Blue Cross to
control "overbedding." Those HMO's like the Kaiser Foundation
Plan which maintain their own hospitals keep their number of hospi-
tal beds relatively low and their bed occupancy rates relatively high.,'
Since it costs a hospital two thirds as much to operate an empty
bed as a full bed,4" it is apparent that the lower the occupancy rate
of a hospital's beds, the more inefficient is that hospital's operation.49
In mid-1971 hospitals in the United States were operating at 73.5
percent of capacity, down almost two percent from a year earlier. 51
Since there is reason to believe that Blue Cross encourages hospital
admissions and thus the need for hospital beds in the first place51 and
since experts suggest that Blue Cross, unlike HMO's, does nothing
10 Stark County Inter-Hospital Agency Agreement, supra note 39; Inter-Hospital Agency
Contract (Lima, Ohio), supra note 40.
" Until recently, of the seven Blue Cross plans operating in Ohio only one had an agree-
ment with its local regional health planning agency not to reimburse hospitals for construction
costs spent on facilities not approved by the planning agency.
0 It is estimated by the Ohio Governor's Task Force on Health Care that fifteen to thirty
percent of hospital admissions are unnecessary or inappropriate. OHIO TASK FORCE, supra note
1, at 105.
1' A 1967 study of northeast Ohio hospitals found that those patients covered by third
parties remained in the hospital nine to forty percent longer than self-pay patients with the same
diagnosis. Id.
0 One such HMO keeps its ratio at about 2.0 beds per 1,000 subscribers, a ratio much
below that prevailing generally in the United States. Role of Prepaid, supra note 27, at 939-
41. In Ohio, for example, the Cleveland and Columbus metropolitan statistical areas each have
4.4 beds per 1,000 persons. U. S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1973 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 854 (1973).
'7 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, supra note 2, at 396.
" By 1971 the average daily hospital rate, not including physicians' fees, reached $90. Id.
Recognizing the importance of hospital occupancy rates in the current crisis of rising
health care costs, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has recommended to the
state agencies which administer the Hill-Burton program that if a state plans its hospital bed
needs on the basis of separate services, bed occupancy rates should be ninety percent for
medical-surgical, seventy-five percent for obstetrics, and seventy-five percent for pediatrics. If
planning is not separate, the overall bed occupancy rate of a hospital should be eighty-five
percent. HEALTH SERVICES AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION AND WELFARE, POLICY MEMORANDUM, HEALTH CARE FACILITIES SERVICE (1973).
x INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, supra note 2, at 396.
II See note 30 supra; see note 45 supra.
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to control the number of hospital beds,52 it is clear that at least some
of the blame for the high rate of unoccupied beds is attributable to
Blue Cross.
A third reason Blue Cross practices promote inefficiencies in
hospital operation is that Blue Cross plays a "safety valve" role as
guarantor of hospital solvency.53 So marked is the last tradition that
Blue Cross contracts commonly provide that in the event the Blue
Cross plan is dissolved its contingency reserves (built up from subscri-
ber premium payments) will be distributed to Blue Cross member
hospitals.54
Still another inflationary practice followed by some Blue Cross
plans is that of allowing a Blue Cross "Hospital Advisory Council"
(made up entirely of hospital administrators from Blue Cross
member-hospitals) to review applications by individual member-
hospitals for increases in their charges. 55 At one Midwestern plan, the
procedure is for a hospital administrator to submit his application for
an" increase first to the hospital's board of trustees, then to Blue
Cross, and finally to the Hospital Advisory Council, which has the
power to accept, modify, or reject the application." Because all hospi-
tal administrators in this particular plan are operating under a reim-
bursement formula of ninety-seven percent-of-charges/105 percent-
of-costs and each administrator will periodically be put in the role of
applicant before the council, it is not difficult to see that this practice
does little to control costs. Recent statistics confirm that the proce-
dure has little cost-control effect: of the twenty-nine charge increase
applications made to the Hospital Advisory Council of this Midwest-
ern plan in 1971, twenty-four were accepted, four were modified, and
only one was rejected.57
The economic effect of all of these practices by Blue Cross is set
forth in the following exchange, which took place at the Lima, Ohio,
rate hearing held by the Ohio Department of Insurance:
Q.: [by Mr. D. Brown (one of the authors of this article) for the
Ohio Department of Insurance] Does that agreement [of the Blue
Cross Association with its member hospitals] contain any language
about comprehensive health planning?
52 ROEMER, supra note 26, at 24.
13 See note 15 supra. For a discussion by a court of this traditional view of Blue Cross,
see Borland v. Bayonne Hospital, 122 N.J. Super. 387, 300 A.2d 584 (1973).
See e.g., Stark County Inter-Hospital Agency Agreement, supra note 39.
See Hearings Before Ohio Dep't of Insurance, In re Application of Blue Cross of
Central Ohio for Change of Rates for Direct Pay Subscribers (August 9-10, 1972) (on file at





A.: [by Mr. Temmer, Executive Director of Lima, Ohio, Blue
Cross] No.
Q.: Have you ever, as a matter of policy, refused to provide serv-
ices to your subscribers at a hospital which had been constructed
or expanded without approval of the local health planning agency?
A.: No, because the occasion has never arisen. It has never been
a question.
Q.: If you were a hospital administrator at one of the hospitals
with which you have become familiar and were faced with a choice
of purchasing one operating table from one seller or another sub-
stantially more expensive one from another seller and they had
substantially the same characteristics, would the Inter-Hospital
Agency Agreement reimbursement formula which reimburses at
108 percent of cost offer you any motivation to choose the cheaper
of the two?
A.: No.5
The hospitals need not gear their operations toward efficiency when
they know Blue Cross will always reimburse them in full for whatever
costs they incur.
These Blue Cross practices indicate an allegiance by Blue Cross
to the providers rather than to the consumers of health care, a point
that has been commented on frequently in recent years. Professor
Law states that the providers of health care, and in particular the
hospitals, control Blue Cross.59 Dr. Starkweather comments: "Most
Blue Cross plans were sponsored by hospitals, and hospitals continue
to heavily influence their affairs."' 0 Senator Kennedy and others
point out that in the past the boards of Blue Cross have been domi-
nated by provider interests, mainly hospital interests."1 The composi-
tion of the board is slowly changing," but heavy influence by provi-
ders continues nonetheless."
Symptomatic of the lack of representation of subscriber interests
by Blue Cross is an increasing trend over the years by provider plans
Lima, Ohio, Hearings, supra note 12, at 231, 266.
I d.; S. LAW, supra note 1, at ch. II.
N Starkweather, Regulation of Health Insurance: A Review; Part I, 1970 MEDICAL CARE
REv. 335, 338.
,3 E. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 209. See also Starkweather, supra note 60, at 339.
62 E. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 209; see note 92 infra.
OHIO TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 107. Significantly, Congress has sought to avoid
this pitfall of conflicts of interest in the HMO's. P.L. 93-222 requires a board one-third
comprised of subscribers and, further, equitable representation of the poor. See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 93-714 at 35.
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to become more like the commercial plans.64 Those organizational
characteristics that used to separate the Blue Cross plans from com-
mercial plans have either remained in form only or ceased to exist
entirely. 5 Community sponsorship of Blue Cross which allows it spe-
cial tax advantages, is being attacked on the ground that Blue Cross
corporations are no more nonprofit than mutual insurance compa-
nies. 6 The practice of establishing the same premium rate levels for
all subscribers in the same community ("community rating") is now
being abandoned by Blue Cross iih favor of a "merit rating" (some-
times called "experience rating") system, by virtue of which the rates
of group subscribers are based on the loss experience of their group
alone. 7
Congress has firmly committed insurance regulation to the
states through the McCarran Act.66 Therefore, any impetus to change
the relationship between Blue Cross and hospitals must come from
the states. The problem becomes more urgent as national health
insurance proposals come closer to adoption. All of the proposals call
for putting billions more dollars into the hands of health insurance
subscribers, and some of them also call for use of Blue Cross as an
insurance carrier and/or an intermediary. 9 An excerpt from a state
insurance department order denying a rate increase to one Midwest-
" Starkweather, supra note 60, at 345-46; 0. DICKERSON, HEALTH INSURANCE, Ch. 10,
Medical Expense: Problems and Issues (3d ed. 1968).
" 0. DICKERSON, supra note 64, at 323.
Id. at 324; see Hospital Service Association of Toledo v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 179, 57
N.E.2d 928 (1944).
67 Starkweather, supra note 60, at 350. An interesting example of a switch to merit rating
occurred in Canton, Ohio. At a hearing held by the Ohio Department of Insurance on a rate
increase request by Canton Blue Cross (Blue Cross Hospital Plan, Inc.), Blue Cross President
Parker attributed the decision to abandon community rating to "pressures from our big groups
and from our competitors." Under merit rating, nongroup (or "direct pay") subscribers paid
premium rates based only on the loss experience of all other nongroup subscribers. Shortly
thereafter, Blue Cross began to show losses on its direct pay business, even though overall the
financial position of the plan grew stronger. At a subsequent rate hearing held July 5-6, 1972,
Blue Cross argued that considerations of fairness dictated that each category of business "pay
its own way." Hearing Before Ohio Dep't of Insurance, In re Application for Rate Increase
by Blue Cross Hospital Plan, Inc. (July 5-6, 1972). Seemingly, then, large groups of subscribers
managed to capture for themselves the advantage of being insured by a tax-exempt, non-profit
insurer, while eliminating from their rating structure the higher risk subscribers (of those who
leave employment, the unhealthiest have the highest incentive to retain insurance coverage and
thus to enter the nongroup category) in their communities. A good subject for research might
be whether the incentive to move to merit rating resulted from labor contracts requiring
employees at large plants to pay the entire cost of their employees' health insurance and thus
involving, for the first time, a direct sale of large amounts of insurance from Blue Cross to big
employers. Employees could be expected to press for merit rating if that would decrease
insurance costs.
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (1971).
" See notes 92-94 infra.
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ern Blue Cross plan summarizes the new identity which Blue Cross
must be made to assume if change is to come:
Blue Cross has failed to exert any effective influence over its mem-
ber hospitals to operate more efficiently and has thereby failed to
control spiraling hospital costs in the Northwest Ohio area. Blue
Cross must shed its traditionally paternalistic attitude toward the
hospitals and assume the position of vigorously representing the
interests of its subscribers. Blue Cross has the duty of seeing that
its subscribers obtain the best health care possible for their dollar
by making every effort to compel member hospitals to effect econ-
omies and to monitor utilization."
C. The Role of Blue Cross under the National Health Insurance
Proposals
The Ninety-third Congress, second session, considered ten pro-
posals for a national health insurance (NHI) plan.7 Of the ten,
three-the Nixon (Ford) Administration plan, the Kennedy-Mills
plan, and the Long-Ribicoff bill-are likely to be reintroduced in
substantially the same form in the Ninety-fourth Congress and are
given a significant chance of passage in 1975.72 If an NHI bill passes
in the near future, it will probably combine some of the features of
all three plans. Importantly, each of the three plans contemplates a
large role for Blue Cross.73
The Comprehensive Health Insurance Act of 1974 (the Nixon
bill) would make health insurance available to all Americans through
three separate programs: (a) an employee health insurance plan
(EHIP), offered at a person's place of employment and underwritten
by an existing private insurance carrier, with the cost of the insurance
to be shared by employer and employee (first on a 65/35 percent
basis; after three years, on a 75/25 percent basis-in each case with
the employer paying the larger share); (b) an assisted health insurance
plan (AHIP), covering people with low income and others not eligible
for EHIP or medicare, with federal and state governments paying
70 Superintendent De Shetler, Ohio Dep't of Insurance, Denial of Blue Cross of Northwest
Ohio Rate Increase, Nov. 24, 1972 (unreported). Cited in In re Blue Cross of Northwest Ohio,
Case No. 73AP-158 at 4 (Ct.App. Franklin Co. 1973).
1' The National Health Care Services Reorganization and Financing Act of 1973 (H.R.
1); The Health Security Act of 1973 (H.R. 22, S. 3); The National Catastrophic Illness Protec-
tion Act of 1973 ("Medicredit") (H.R. 2222, S. 444); National Health Care Act of 1973 (H.R.
5200, S. 1100); The National Comprehensive Health Insurance Act of 1974 (administration
bill) (H.R. 12684, S. 2970); The National Health Insurance and Health Services Improvement
Act of 1973 (S. 915); The Catastrophic Health Insurance and Medical Assistance Reform Act
(S. 2513); The Comprehensive National Health Insurance Act of 1973 (H.R. 13870, S. 3286).
" See Rivlin, Agreed: Here Comes National Health Insurance, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1974
(Magazine) at 8 et seq.; see generally, 4 NATioNAL HEALTH INSURANCE REPORTS 1-2 (1974).
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costs beyond the means of the person insured; and (c) an expanded
medicare program, with much the same financing mechanism that is
used today.74
The Nixon bill would have the federal government establish
standards for eligibility under the three plans, define the services to
be reimbursed, and then assign many of the administrative duties of
the program to the states. Significantly, states would contract with
intermediaries to offer the basic plan to all residents enrolling in
AHIP and would review for reasonableness premium rates filed by
private insurance carriers offering coverage under EHIP. Private in-
surance carriers would be required to disclose information with re-
gard to services covered, rates, and the relation between premiums
and benefits paid.75
The Catastrophic Health Insurance and Medical Assistance
Reform Act (the Long-Ribicoff bill) would apply mainly to persons
now eligible for medicare or medicaid.
It would establish a catastrophic illness health insurance plan,
federally administered and federally financed by a .3 percent increase
in social security taxes. The bill also proposes the replacement of
medicaid with a uniform national program of medical benefits for
low-income persons, administered by the Social Security Administra-
tion. Both programs would use the same administrative mechanisms
used for the administration of medicare, including medicare's carriers
and intermediaries. 76
The Comprehensive National Health Insurance Act of 1974 (the
Kennedy-Mills bill) would establish a contributory program of na-
tional health insurance under the Social Security Act offering com-
prehensive health care benefits to all Americans not covered by medi-
care.
The bill would repeal the present medicaid program. The na-
tional health program would be financed by contributions from em-
ployers, employees, the self-employed, those with unearned incomes,
and, for certain additional benefits for low-income persons, by gen-
eral revenues. A national health insurance trust fund would be estab-
lished to receive and hold separate from the federal budget contribu-
tions to the program, which would be administered by a reconstituted
Social Security Administration. For institutional (e.g., hospital) serv-
ices, the Social Security Administration would use intermediaries
73 The following summaries of these three plans are, with minor modifications, taken
from the NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2.
71 RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 558-61.
75 Id..
71 Id. at 563-65.
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much as it now does under medicare. For physicians' and other non-
institutional services, private insurance carriers selected by employers
with 1,000 or more employees would administer the program for that
employer's employees and dependents, and these employers would
have the option of dealing directly with the Social Security Adminis-
tration. For people not covered by large employers, contracts would
be awarded on a competitive basis by the Social Security Administra-
tion to private insurance carriers for given geographical areas of the
country.77
Of these three major NHI proposals, the Kennedy-Mills plan
seems to contemplate the smallest role for Blue Cross. 71 Nevertheless
under all these national health insurance proposals Blue Cross will
continue to operate in its traditional role as a private insurance car-
rier and/or in its more recently assumed role as an intermediary for
federal funds. Similarly, state regulatory agencies will continue to be
called upon to regulate Blue Cross rates, rating structures, and inter-
nal policies, though none of the bills prescribes the standards the state
will have to apply."
" Id. at 556-68.
" See generally Rivlin, supra note 72.
11 One method currently proposed for controlling hospital costs is the establishment of
state rate-setting commissions empowered to set for each hospital the rate at which it would
be reimbursed by all insurers and, in some states, authorized to determine whether or not new
facilities should be built. Some form of rate-setting commission is already in operation in a
small number of states, including New York and Massachusetts. For a discussion of the new
Maryland and Connecticut commissions, see Some States Try Surgery on Hospital Costs, With
Maryland and Connecticut Leading The Way, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 10, 1974, at 4, cols.
1-3. With the strong approval of the American Hospital Association and the Blue Cross
Association, attempts are being made to establish commissions in more states.
Increasingly, however, questions are being asked about the ability of these commissions
to control hospital costs. In his article entitled Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by
"Certificate of Need," 50 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973), Clark Havighurst criticizes in general the
public utility model as inappropriate for regulating the hospital care establishment.
Others base their criticism of rate-setting commissions on these grounds: (1) commissions
often fail to subject the hospital-Blue Cross reimbursement contract to regulatory scrutiny, so
that hospitals continue to be insulated from normal market forces by provisions for reimburse-
ment at one hundred percent or more of cost; (2) they establish a unitary state-wide approach
to the problem of controlling hospital costs in local communities, thus sacrificing the creativity
and innovation that can come from local control; (3) they fail to take advantage of the expertise
in the financing and delivery of hospital care already possessed by those presently in the health
insurance industry; (4) they entail very high compliance costs (e.g., Massachusetts require 150
employees and an annual budget of $1.5 million for its rate-setting commission); and (5) they
are not highly visible and thus are easily susceptible to domination by the regulatees. Interview
with William Shkurti, Health Economist, Ohio Department of Insurance, Oct. 28, 1974.
Many of these problems can be avoided if Blue Cross and others presently financing
hospital care are forced to exercise cost control responsibility through the reimbursement
contract and other means. Effective regulation of these insurers by presently established state
insurance departments is essential to that end.
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Since at present about twenty percent of the civilian population
under sixty-five years of age is wholly uninsured 0 and since many of
those eighty percent insured have less than comprehensive coverage, S
NHI proposals like the Kennedy-Mills and Nixon bills which make
broad coverage available to all persons can be expected to increase
health expenditures significantly. Blue Cross is urging strongly that
it be permitted to occupy a central role under NHI,s2 and it appears
that Blue Cross will prevail. At the minimum, under most NHI
proposals Blue Cross should continue as insurance carrier for the
seventy-six million persons it now insures83 and should retain its
additional role as intermediary between the patient and the govern-
ment. Thus a very large percentage of payments made to hospitals
should continue to come from or through Blue Cross. If the tradi-
tional economic and contractual relationship between Blue Cross and
the hospitals continues unchanged, the present inflationary trend in
expenditures for hospital care can be expected to continue. In that
event, the threat to the financial well-being of persons which now
comes in the form of unaffordable medical bills would instead under
NHI come in the form of unaffordable health insurance premium
rates.
D. State Statutes and Rules Governing Blue Cross
Forty-eight states have enabling legislation for nonprofit hospi-
tal service organizations (i.e., Blue Cross)." These enabling laws most
often place the authority to regulate Blue Cross in the state's depart-
ment of insurance-in forty-one states the insurance department has
the responsibility for supervising Blue Cross, in two other states Blue
Cross is regulated by some other state. agency, while in a few states
no regulatory agency is responsible for supervision of Blue Cross.8
The enabling legislation generally exempts Blue Cross from the
provisions of state law applicable to commercial insurers, though
certain sections of the law governing commercial insurers may be
specifically included. 8 Areas where Blue Cross is subject to the same
80 RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 74-75.
s Id.
82 Hearings on NHI Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.,
vol. 3, at 1031-68 (1974) (testimony of Walter J. McNerney, President, Blue Cross Associa-
tion).
s3 RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 72-73.
s MARKUS & HAUCH, STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, 80-83
(1972); S. LAW, supra note 1, at Ch. I (Introduction).
S. LAW, supra note 1, at Ch. II, Sec. A.
" MARKUS & HAUCH, supra note 84, at 80.
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requirements as commercial insurers commonly include limitations
on investments an insurer may make, examination and reporting
requirements, and policy form filing and approval procedures.87
In addition, the enabling laws often require an insurance depart-
ment to review the composition of a Blue Cross plan's board of
directors, limit a plan's subscriber contract forms, approve in ad-
vance all increases in subscriber rates, monitor existing rate levels,
and review and monitor reimbursement contracts between a plan and
its member hospitals." Most state enabling laws do not, however,
provide for a public hearing on proposed rate changes.8" The stan-
dards set forth in the enabling laws for judging subscriber rates are
generally quite broad. Terms such as "fair and reasonable" or not
"excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory" are common. 0
The enabling statutes in over ten states explicitly require the
insurance commissioner to review the reimbursement contracts be-
tween Blue Cross plans and their member hospitals. 1 Although stat-
utes in other states are silent on regulation of hospital reimbursement
arrangements, regulation of subscriber rates in those states would
necessarily appear to require examination of Blue Cross reimburse-
ment to hospitals. 2 It is often impossible to make an intelligent anal-
ysis of the necessity of a rate increase without first examining the
contractual relationships between the rate-charging regulatee and
those suppliers from which it acquires the components of its product.
States have been quite sparing in their use of administrative rule-
making powers to supplement powers provided by the enabling laws.
Among all the states' regulatory agencies with authority over Blue
Cross, apparently only the Ohio Department of Insurance has chosen
to use its statutory administrative procedure act powers to promul-
gate formal regulations supplementing its statutory powers to regu-
late Blue Cross. 3 However, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Michi-
gan, and West Virginia have used rule-making by adjudication (dis-
cussed infra) to adopt rules governing Blue Shield and Blue Cross. 4
" Id. at 83.
u Id. at 85.
' Id. at 102.
Id. at 98, 99; S. LAW, supra note 1, at Ch. II.
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
South Dakota, Texas, MARKUS & HAUCH, supra note 84, at 104. Subsequent to Markus and
Hauch's study, Ohio's law was amended to provide for examination of reimbursement
contracts. OHIo REV. CODE § 1739.051 (1971).
11 S. LAW, supra note I, at Ch. II, Sec. A.
'3 Ohio Rules Hearings, supra note 23 (testimony of Sylvia Law and Sidney Wolfe,
M.D.).
" New Hampshire-Vermont Physician Service v. Durkin, .N.H._, 313 A.2d 416
(N.H. 1973); Opinion and Order of the Honorable Daniel I. Demlow, Commissioner of Insur-
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Indeed, before turning to administrative procedure act rule-making,
Ohio unsuccessfully attempted to use rule-making by adjudication to
promulgate rules governing Blue Cross.95
The regulatory mechanism established by these statutes is far
from comprehensive. However, the present statutes do permit more
effective regulation of Blue Cross than is attempted by the majority
of state regulatory agencies. As Dr. Starkweather observed in 1970:
[A] number of states have granted powers to insurance commission-
ers which have not been fully exercised. Without either new regula-
tion or new court precedent, government has the opportunity to
exercise greater regulation if it so desires. 6
The truth of this observation is borne out by the fact that the insur-
ance departments of Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Hampshire,
Michigan, and West Virginia have used statutes little or no different
from those in force in most states to push Blue Cross in the area of
cost control. When necessary, those state insurance departments have
created needed new regulations either by use of their quasi-legislative
rule-making powers or by use of their power to adjudicate rate cases.
But judging from their recorded efforts to date, states interested
in actively regulating their nonprofit health insurance industry re-
main a small minority, so small that Professor Law introduces her
book on Blue Cross by saying:
A major, and perhaps the most disturbing, theme of this book is the
massive failure of the public regulatory agencies to regulate either
Blue Cross or the hospitals in the interest of consumers.97
If states decide to become more active in their regulatory efforts,
the experience of those states now engaged in regulation of Blue
Cross can be instructive. The second part of this article will survey
the regulatory programs of various states, concentrating on and ana-
lyzing the goals of those programs and the strategies being used to
reach those goals.
ance, In re 1974 Rate Review of Michigan Hospital Service (April 29, 1974) (on file at
Michigan Department of Commerce, Insurance Bureau); Order of Samuel H. Weese, Insur-
ance Commissioner, In the Matter of Review of Certain Operations, Practices and Procedures
of Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc., Rate Filing of April 4, 1972 (Nov. 15, 1972), rev'd as to
rate denied subscriber nominee. Rate filing of Blue Cross Hospital Services, Inc., Civil Action
Nos. 11,956 and 12,054 (Cir.Ct.W.Va., June 13, 1973), reversal under appeal (all documents
on file with West Virginia Insurance Commissioner).
15 In re Application of Blue Cross, 34 Ohio Misc. 29, 33-36, 296 N.E.2d 305, 307-09
(Franklin Co. C.P. 1972).
,1 Starkweather, Regulation of Health Insurance: A Review; Part II, 1970 MEDICAL CARE
REV. 474, 486.
,7 S. LAW, supra note 1, at 2.
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II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: REGULATORY STRATEGIES AVAILABLE
TO STATES
A. Goals in Regulating Blue Cross
The first part of this article demonstrated the misallocation
problems caused by present methods of financing hospital care. In
attempting to correct these problems, states are offering the following
general goals:
1. Building incentives into the health care delivery system.
Of primary concern is a change in the retrospectively applied
cost-reimbursement formula contained in the contract between Blue
Cross and its member hospitals. To provide an incentive toward effi-
ciency, the contract should contain a prospective cost-reimbursement
formula whereby hospitals budget the whole year in advance and
insurance companies set aside a certain amount based on that for-
mula. The experience of health maintenance organizations is instruc-
tive in showing how incentives lead to cost efficiencies. The HMO's
shift part of the risk associated with illness to providers, encouraging
the latter to perform efficiently. 8 The regulators should require
changes in Blue Cross plans whereby ambulatory care rather than
hospital care is encouraged, as is the case with HMO's.
2. Encouraging community-wide planning in all areas of health
care delivery.
This article has demonstrated that capital expenditures on hospi-
tals are grossly inefficient. The regulator should require that Blue
Cross (a) reimburse only those hospitals that participate in a program
of genuine community-wide health care planning, and then (b) reim-
burse only for those capital and other expenditures deemed necessary
for the health needs of the general community.
3. Encouraging the development of alternative forms of care.
Statistics cited earlier indicate that much of the cost crisis in the
delivery of hospital care is caused by unnecessary hospital admissions
and/or excessive number of days spent in hospitals. Under these
circumstances, the states should consider ways to encourage the de-
velopment of health care methods that do not involve admission to a
hospital. At the same time, states should consider ways to identify
and control, through peer review or otherwise, excessive lengths of
stay, perhaps by shifting the cost of such stays to the attending physi-
cian or to the insurer.
4. Proscribing conflicts of interest.
The providers of health care face a conflict of interest when they
i Role of Prepaid, supra note 27, at 997.
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make policy decisions for Blue Cross that directly affect them finan-
cially. This conflict of interest in policy-making should be eliminated,
although it may be prudent to retain providers in advisory capacities
to Blue Cross.
5. Changing bargaining procedures.
In the private sector only the health insurers, in particular Blue
Cross, have the economic muscle to bargain with the hospitals to
obtain health care efficiencies. Clearly no hospital patient or group
of patients has such economic power.
Adequate representation of subscribers is the standard the regu-
lators should require of the health insurance industry. Even with the
objective of reducing hospital costs the regulators should not demand
that insurers produce specified results, for insurers may fail to elimi-
nate unnecessary and inefficient costs in hospital operation although
exerting a good faith effort. What the regulators should demand is a
good faith effort by the insurers to use their economic muscle to fight
rising health care costs.
The example of labor relations is instructive on this point. Under
national labor law good faith bargaining involves going to the table
together and making good faith proposals. The regulator can judge
good faith by a look at "the whole record," "[t]he impact of all such
occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly
drawn therefrom collectively. . . ."" The insurance regulator, by
analogy, can determine whether the insurer is meeting its implied
obligations to its subscribers by a look at its total activity. In addi-
tion, the regulator might require the insurer to bargain with the hospi-
tals one by one, for that would enhance the bargaining position of the
insurers.
In general, the goal of a state's regulatory efforts should be to
move the health insurance industry (especially Blue Cross) from
being a passive observer of the rise of health care costs to becoming
an active intervenor on behalf of subscribers.
B. Procedures Available for Reaching Those Goals
An analysis of the enabling laws of most states reveals that, like
most rate-making agencies, insurance departments generally have
only two sanctions available to them for changing the behavior of
Blue Cross: license revocation (or review of the certificate of incorpo-
ration, which is analagous) and rate-making.10 Likewise, there are
,9 NLRB v. National Shoes, Inc., 208 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1953).
101 Note that while other economic sanctions such as fines or forfeitures are also avilable
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two general methods available to insurance departments by which
they can establish the norms toward which they want the behavior of
Blue Cross to change: statutory reform and either quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial rule-making.
The rationale of each method of establishing norms and of each
method of enforcing compliance should be examined.
1. Rule-making: quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
Quasi-legislative rule-making, whereby rules prospective in na-
ture and general in application are developed in the framework of a
hearing convened solely for that purpose, is much like the procedure
used by legislatures to develop and adopt new laws. Draft rules are
proposed and distributed in advance of a hearing, a hearing is con-
vened for the gathering of views about the rules, the rules are re-
drafted to take into account the views expressed, and ultimately the
rules are promulgated. The advantages of quasi-legislative rule-
making or of statutory reform lie in the precision of the standards
set up and in the certainty of agency outlook caused by that precision.
Quasi-legislative rule-making does not in itself guarantee that any
broader spectrum of viewpoints will be brought to bear on a problem,
for rule-making hearings seem often to be dominated by industry
viewpoint. Furthermore, when the rules deal with very new or com-
plex problems, such hearings may bring forward no solutions at all.
Rules can also be developed on a case-by-case basis in adjudica-
tory proceedings. This procedure-variously called ad hoc rule-
making or rule-making by adjudication-is the same procedure used
any time one applies a general statutory standard to a specific set of
facts and determines whether there is present or absent in the facts
"fairness," "lawfulness," or the like.1"' Each impartial application of
the standard to each new set of facts creates a new and narrower
definition of "fairness" or "lawfulness" and creates a new "rule"
governing conduct if that set of facts recurs. Even if this new "rule"
is limited to precisely the facts being judged under the general stan-
dard, those who know that they may find themselves in the same
factual circumstances in the future are bound to pay careful attention
to these adjudication-made rules and to govern their behavior accord-
ingly.102
to enforce compliance with rules, periodic imposition of meaningful economic sanctions would
differ little from periodic review and adjustment of rates.
" Some of these ideas are set forth in an earlier case comment by one of the authors of
this article. See D. Brown, Rule-Making by Adjudication in Rate-Making Proceedings-Some
Notes on the Regulation of Blue Cross, 604 INs.L.J. 264 (1973).
"' Administrative agencies may exercise their discretion in the choice of formal rule-
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OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
2. Developing rules by adjudicating rate cases
In the 1968 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,0 3 the Supreme
Court overruled the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit and allowed to stand a Federal Power Commission decision
in a classic case of rule promulgation in a rate-making adjudication.
The FPC chose an entirely new rate structure for natural gas
pipeline companies in the Permian Basin, and in so doing formulated
a pricing rule to promote the exploration and development of new
sources of gas while keeping in force old prices for previously ex-
ploited gas. Under this new pricing rule, the FPC took into considera-
tion matters other than the contract price paid by the pipeline compa-
nies for the gas they purchased. One of these additional factors was
the public's interest in receiving gas at a fair price. Though this
pricing method was entirely new, the FPC applied it retroactively to
the case it was adjudicating.
The Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Harlan, affirmed the FPC
order in toto, with only Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting. The Court
said:
The Commission may ...employ price functionally in order to
achieve relevant regulatory purposes .... 104
In the Permian Basin rate proceedings, according to the Su-
preme Court, the FPC was faced with the following problem:
"[D]eficiencies of the market mechanism . . . inability or unwilling-
ness of interstate pipelines to bargain vigorously for reduced prices
• . .[leading to] circumstances in which price increases unconnected
with changes in cost may readily be obtained."'' 5 The market, accord-
ing to the Court and according to the commission, was "'essentially
[a] monopsonistic environment,' "106 so that:
[c]onsumers [had] been left without effective protection against
steadily rising prices. . . .The consumer [was] thus obliged to rely
upon the Commission to provide "a complete, permanent, and
effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges."' 1
making or rule-making by adjudication. The only limitation is that the agency must act consis-
tently with the method it has chosen (i.e. it cannot promulgate formal rules through an adjudi-
catory hearing). See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974); see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (plurality opinion per Fortas, J.).
1- 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
'0 Id. at 797.
M' Id. at 793-94.
108 Id. at 794.
"I Id. at 794-95.
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The Supreme Court found that, given the changing market condi-
tions, the FPC was fully justified in the procedure it used.0 8
In Permian Basin, the Supreme Court spoke clearly of the FPC's
duty to use its rate-making power to protect the public interest,
broadly defined:
[The Commission is] obliged at each step of its regulatory process
to assess the requirements of the broad public interests entrusted to
its protection by Congress. Accordingly, the "end result" of the
Commission's orders must be measured as much by the success with
which they protect these interests as by the effectiveness with which
they "maintain. .. credit and. . . attract capital. . . ."The Com-
mission's responsibilities necessarily oblige it to give continuing at-
tention to values that may be reflected only imperfectly by produ-
cers' costs; a regulatory method that excluded as immaterial all but
current or projected costs could not properly serve the consumer
interests placed under the Commission's protection.'
The Supreme Court further pointed out that cost and noncost
factors do not "race one against the other"; rather, they must be
"harnessed side by side."110
This particular holding in Permian Basin has been closely fol-
lowed in subsequent federal litigation."1 In Southern Louisiana Area
Rate Cases"' the Fifth Circuit said:
We do not understand the law of industry regulation . . . to pro-
hibit noncost elements that are based upon appropriate grounds. In
Permian the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that the FPC is
not bound by the sum of cost and return even if it adopts cost as
the primary basis of its calculations."'
1" Ramifications of the FPC policy approved in Permian Basin have been criticized. See
Dakin, Ratemaking as Rulemaking-The New Approach at the FPC: Ad Hoc Rulemaking in
the Ratemaking Process, 1973 DUKE L.J. 41. However, this criticism of FPC policy is not
relevant for the purposes of this article. Here the relevance of Permian Basin relates mainly to
the procedure the Supreme Court upheld. The policy ramifications are significant only so far
as they bear upon whether the procedure in any way caused a possibly unwise result. Here, it
did not. Contra, id. The major procedural criticism one can aim at Permian Basin is that by
the time the policy was put into effect times had changed drastically: an energy crisis was
looming. (The proceedings began in 1960; the Supreme Court decided Permian Basin in 1968.)
One can argue that the process took far too long, but the fault does not lie in the use of rule-
promulgating adjudications. Federal agencies have become notorious for the time it takes them
to make a decision, no matter what procedure is used.
'" Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 791, 815 (1968) (footnote omitted).
"'Id. at 815.
" See, e.g., Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Southern Louisiana]; In re Hugoton-
Anadarko Area Rate Case, 466 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1972).
2 Southern Louisiana, supra note I 1l.
Id. at 426.
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Southern Louisiana also adds support to the proposition that a regu-
lator can look behind the application of the regulatee and examine
contracts entered into and practices of the regulatee. In Southern
Louisiana the court held that the regulator has the power to assess
the consequences of a rate decision upon the industry, including
"most importantly, the industry's probable conduct and performance
as a result of the order."'1 4
In following Permian Basin the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit recently stated in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC:I"
More significantly, the FPC's jurisdiction over rates chargeable by
a producer includes authority to determine the reasonableness of
costs incurred, even though these are not subject to direct FPC
control, and that establishes authority to review royalty payments,
or drilling rig rentals, or any other element of the producer's cost
of service. [Permian Basin Area Rate Cases]."'
This language from Mobil Oil, which cites Permian for its au-
thority, illustrates the scope of inquiry which can be undertaken by a
regulator which has been given the duty of deciding the rates at which
a regulatee may sell its product to the public. The regulator implicitly
has the authority to look at the fairness or reasonableness, not only
of the price at which the product is sold to the public, but also of the
terms under which the regulatee has acquired the components of the
product. The relevance of such authority to the health insurance
regulator is clear. From their inception Blue Cross associations have
built into their operations heavy involvement of both hospital admin-
istrators and physicians. Thus health care providers are expected to
represent health care consumers whose interests do not always coin-
cide with those of the providers. Such a conflict of interest automati-
cally calls for close scrutiny of contracts between the regulatee, Blue
Cross, and the hospitals from which the regulatee purchases services.
A number of analogous state court cases lend support to broad-
based determinations by rate-makers. In a recent case, State ex rel.
Utilities Commission v. General Telephone of the Southeast,"7 the
North Carolina supreme court affirmed a rate-making decision in
which the North Carolina Utilities Commission promulgated rules
applicable to the regulatee and to future regulatees. Faced with a case
in which there was a close affiliation between the utility and a supplier
of products for that utility, the court held that the effect of the affilia-
"I Id. at 441.
"1 463 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
118 Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
11 281 N.C. 318, 189 S.E.2d 705 (1972).
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tion is such that the "relationship calls for a close scrutiny by the
Commission of the price paid by the utility.""' "[T]he bargaining is
not at arm's length and when the transaction is called in question, the
burden is upon the utility to show that the price it paid was reasona-
ble."'1 9 Similarly, the affiliation between Blue Cross and members
hospitals should call for "close scrutiny" by regulators.
The court went on to hold that plant construction by the utility
which the Utilities Commission deemed not in the best interests of
the company and the public was not includible in the rate base. The
court referred to some construction of buildings as padding the rate
base, and added:
a utility may not inflate its rate base by extravagance in purchasing
equipment or constructing its plant. In this connection, it is imma-
terial whether such extravagance be due to careless improvidence or
to willful payment of exorbitant prices to an affiliate. "'-
Faced with a similar issue of whether certain construction and
equipment for future use which would not benefit the present rate
payers could be included in the rate base, the court held, "The present
rate payers may not be required to pay excessive rates for service to
provide a return on property which will not be needed in providing
utility service within the reasonable future."'' The remoteness of the
benefits of some items included in the "reasonable cost" of hospital
care 2 '1 should also be considered by health insurance regulators.
Three Ohio supreme court decisions firmly establish that in Ohio
an agency need not confine its inquiry to mere verification of the costs
paid by a regulatee in producing its product but may properly inquire
into whether the costs paid were reasonable.'2 The regulator is given
express permission to look behind the contract to determine its fair-
ness, and if it determines that the contract price is not fair, to lower
the rate base accordingly.'2
In Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Utilities Commission'24 the regula-
tor was charged with seeing that utility rates were "just and reason-
able" and "lawful." Two regulated electric companies that formerly
it Id. at 345, 189 S.E.2d at 723.
" Id. at 346, 189 S.E.2d at 723.
I d. at 344, 189 S.E.2d at 722.
"' Id. at 353, 189 S.E.2d at 727.
121A See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
lu Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 106 Ohio St. 138, 140 N.E. 143 (1922);
Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 110 Ohio St. 246, 143 N.E. 700 (1924);
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 133 Ohio St. 212, 12 N.E.2d 765 (1938).
12 Id.
"2 Cited supra note 122.
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purchased power to sell to subscribers from independent generating
companies began purchasing power at higher cost from a generating
company that was now a sister susidiary of their common parent. The
Ohio supreme court ordered the Public Utilities Commission to lower
the rates collected by the electric companies. The court specifically
found that the commission could use its rate-making power over the
regulated producer to examine the regulatee's relationship with its
suppliers and to force the regulatee to change the terms of its contract
with its suppliers'25 when that contract contravened the public interest
in obtaining electric power at fair rates. The standard implicitly ad-
hered to by the Ohio supreme court was that a producer and its
suppliers must bargain "at arm's length."
It appears that public utilities commissions have plenary author-
ity to scrutinize closely the relationship between regulatee and sup-
plier of a product to the regulatee. Regulators of Blue Cross probably
have similar authority. Both public utilities and Blue Cross
associations are community-wide services. Blue Cross was created as
an instrument for making health care available to the entire com-
munity; public utilities were created to provide their services to a
similarly broad segment of the community. Thus the analogy between
regulation of public utilities and regulation of health insurance asso-
ciations is apposite.
The New York case of Thaler v. Stern12 1 makes the analogy
explicit. That case dealt squarely with the issue of what factors a
superintendent of insurance must appraise when considering a rate
increase. The court was asked to review action taken by a superin-
tendent of insurance on a rate application by a hospital service corpo-
ration called AHS (a Blue Cross-type organization). The superin-
tendent's approval of a rate increase was being challenged because he
had refused to consider (1) AHS's failure to exert influence over
hospital costs and inefficiencies, (2) the effect that this failure had on
the rate of reimbursement of the hospitals by AHS, and (3) the effect
of all the foregoing on subscriber rates. Although the court affirmed
the decision as being within the superintendent's discretion, it stated
that the superintendent had a duty to consider the effect of hospital
costs and inefficiencies on the reimbursement rate and thus on sub-
scriber rates:
In 1960, respondent's predecessor when approving the basic for-
mula, recognized that "the reasonableness of any hospital reim-
bursement proposal must necessarily be assessed in light of-though
125 Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, supra note 122, at 142, 140 N.E. at 144.
1 44 Misc. 2d 278, 253 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup.Ct. 1964).
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not controlled by-the structure of current hospital pricing proce-
dures." An evident corollary of this is that the reasonableness of any
subscriber rate proposal must necessarily be assessed in the light of
the operation and effect of the hospital reimbursement formula. We
reject the restrictive interpretation the Superintendent puts upon his
authority. Surely, we must conclude, by implication if not other-
wise, that the Superintendent has been empowered to do all that is
reasonably necessary to fulfill the duties imposed upon him [i.e., to
determine if a proposed rate increase is either inadequte or exces-
sive].'
The court went on to say that, in order to protect the subscribers, the
superintendent should actively intervene in the contractual arrange-
ments between the regulatee (the Blue Cross association) and the
hospitals when the public interest requires it.
In summary, Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Utilities Commission"8
and State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. General Telephone of the
Southeast' stand for the proposition that a rate-making agency does
not have to grant a rate increase simply because the costs paid by the
rate-charging regulatee have risen. The state supreme courts deciding
those cases obviously believed that in rate matters what lies behind
the cost figures is as important as the cost figures themselves. Man-
agement and policy decisions made by regulatees in the course of
running their businesses may account for most of the costs reflected
in the rate increase application. To ignore what lies behind the appli-
cation would be to allow regulatees to build an equitable claim to a
rate increase in circumstances where the need was of their own mak-
ing and would disappear if management and policy decisions were
changed.
Thaler refined the concept the above cases put forward. Accord-
ing to that decision, the regulator should intervene to stop contracts
which the regulatee plans to enter into if they significantly injure the
public. The honorable intent of the regulatee or the absence of any
harmful overt act is irrelevant. Hence, the failure to bargain effec-
tively for a new contract is in itself a reason to deny the rate sought
to be charged to the consumer.
Permian Basin seems to carry those regulatory considerations to
their fullest development. In Permian Basin the Supreme Court said
that in making rules during the adjudication of a rate increase request
a regulator is not limited to proscribing those costs incurred because
'n Id. at 288-89, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
' Cited supra note 122.
I2 Cited supra note 117.
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there is chicanery in economic bargaining due to some allied relation-
ship, '3 or even to proscribing business activities that are inconsistent
with normal business practices.131 Permian Basin gives the regulator
authority to change the behavior of the regulatee even when the latter
is acting ethically and following normal business practices. In effect,
the regulator is given the authority to change the regulatee's behavior
from one honest and fair business practice to another honest and fair
business practice.' Future regulatee behavior as a result of the rates
set is thus a crucial factor in regulation. 3 3
3. The advantages of rule-making by adjudication
The reasons that an agency oftentimes makes its rules in an
adjudication are set forth in the landmark Chenery II 31 case:
Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a
statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general
rule. . . . [P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative
agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be
solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency
may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem
to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast
rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature
as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general
rule. . . . There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case
evolution of statutory standards."'
This approach indicates a twofold justification for rule promul-
gation by adjudication. First, the accumulation of experience in indi-
vidual cases must precede any effort to elaborate statutory standards
in a way that realistically deals with the myriad actual problems an
agency must consider. Simply to choose general rule-making may
result in overlooking some aspects of the problem or even in propos-
ing the wrong solutions. Adjudication-made rules, however, can
eventually be "codified" into formal rules after the full benefit of
regulatory experience is obtained.'
Second, the legislature may order an agency to find what is
"fair" or "just" or "reasonable" or "in good faith,"-legislative
See text accompanying note 122.
" See text accompanying note 117.
m See text accompanying note 113.
'3 See text accompanying note 114.
' SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) [commonly known as Chenery 11].
I d. at 202-03.
See Shapiro, The Choice of Rule-Making or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921, 927 (1965).
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catch-alls that are often the backbone of an administrative statute.
With such a mandate, it may never be desirable for an agency to
make rules via a formal hearing and adhere to them, for the determi-
nation of these criteria is a continually evolving process as the de-
mands of the society change. The second justification, therefore, is
that the agency must continue to evolve standards and set policies
gradually in order to follow the rather general legislative command.
Rule-making by adjudication is the best approach when the standard
that the statute sets up is, in Justice Cardozo's words, "a way of
life."' 37 The continuing vitality of rule-making by adjudication is
shown by its unanimous acceptance in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co.138
Rule-making by adjudication is particularly useful for the appli-
cation of a new statute. Given the legislative intent in creating admin-
istrative agencies, it is good policy and good law to allow more flexi-
bility, both substantive and procedural, to an administrative agency
when it formulates a res nova application of a recently-enacted stat-
ute than when it is involved in an ensuing application of that statute.
Among the purposes of adjudication is to evolve standards, to
experiment with tentative policy solutions. An agency may not have
had sufficient experience with a problem to develop a hard-and-fast
rule, so it proceeds as a court might under common law. By such an
approach the needed rule is found and not made; human experience
may often be the best background an agency can acquire as it moves
toward a formal rule. 13 Such an approach follows the Holmesian
adage: "The life of the law is not logic; it is experience."
The reasons for the need to promulgate rules in a res nova
proceeding in an adjudicatory framework can be garnered from
Professor Shapiro's article:
[T]he accumulation of experience in individual cases is a necessary
prelude to any effort to elaborate statutory standards in a manner
that deals realistically with actual problems rather than with hypo-
thetical cases that may never arise. In still others, specific rules may
subtract from the force of a general statutory prohibition by in-
advertently setting up guideposts for evasion of the basic statutory
objectives.
In addition, there are numerous situations in which the only
course that is consistent with the legislative purpose is to apply the
statute to the facts without attempting to articulate more precise
M Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
133 Supra note 102.
13' Shapiro, supra note 136.
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rules governing the applicability of the standard. . . Moreover,
the very absence of a specific grant of authority to issue regulations
on a given subject may be a significant factor in leading a court to
conclude that the administrator cannot commit himself in advance
by drawing hard-and-fast lines but must exercise his discretion in
each case."'
The Supreme Court has recognized the need to use rule-making
by adjudication in a res nova proceeding. In Atlantic Refining Co.
v. Public Service Commission .of New York (the CATCO case),' the
Court indicated that the administrator needs more flexibility and
should be given wider discretion during the "formative period when
the ground rules of producer regulation are being evolved." 1 2
Chenery I also -recognized the distinction between a res nova pro-
ceeding and a change in settled law, and the need for an administrator
to have more discretion to experiment in the former context. 1 3
The Supreme Court has recognized for at least a quarter of a
century that the standard of review where a new principle is an-
nounced and applied can be no stricter than the standard of review
in an ordinary administrative action.1" In recent years the Court has
stated that it is less willing to overrule an agency decision in an
experimental stage of regulation, realizing that improvements will
come as regulation in the new area becomes better understood by the
agency.145
Southern Louisiana141 is an especially good example of the appli-
cation of the principle by a United States Court of Appeals. For here
the court was clearly dissatisfied with both the procedure used and
the result reached by an agency. But the agency was sustained in view
of the experimental stage of area regulation. 4 The court promul-
gated guidelines for the agency to follow in future proceedings, believ-
ing that definite improvements would come as the agency became
more proficient in applying the particular statutes and regulations.
4. Superiority of rate-making over licensing
It was noted above that a rate-making agency's statutory author-
I4 d. at 927-28 (footnote omitted).
360 U.S. 378 (1959).
142 Id. at 391.
"1 Chenery II, supra note 134, at 207.
144 Permian Basin, supra note 103, at 788.
"I Id. at 772, 816. This principle was followed in Southern Louisiana, supra note I Il, and
in Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.
1971).




ity is often limited to two types of adjudications, licensing and.rate-
making. As has been pointed out, until recently the rate-making
power has rarely been used to regulate behavior, and even now it is
used sparingly. This section demonstrates that rate-making is supe-
rior to licensing as a regulatory tool.148 There are a number of reasons
why the rate-making power is a more useful and more refined tool
of regulation than the licensing power.
First, the rate-making power motivates positively, whereas the
licensing power motivates negatively. Second, the rate-making power
has creative force; the licensing power has only destructive force.
Third, the rate-making power can be used gradually and in degree;
the licensing power has a summary quality that precipitates rapid
confrontations and quick showdowns.
When the regulator uses its rate approval power the regulatee
has something positive to gain if it changes its behavior, for it can
meet the regulator's standard and then return and obtain a rate in-
crease. Under the licensing power the regulatee is primarily moti-
vated by the fear of extinction. Actions of regulatees in response to
fear, while quicker, are less likely to be creative and innovative than
actions in response to promise of reward. In fact, the threat of extinc-
tion might cause the regulatee to change in too abrupt and too final
a way. The possibility of creative and gradual change is lost with use
of the licensing power. The ultimate threat contained in that
power-seizure-places so much force behind regulator decisions
that regulatees may frequently react to them badly.
In fact, the power to revoke licenses is of such magnitude that
it is often not a useful tool at all for molding and shaping the conduct
of regulatees. Regulatees of any substantial economic worth or social
importance realize that the chances of a license revocation are in-
versely related to their size or worth. Few regulators or judges would
permit a large company to be seized and/or liquidated because of its
policies, unless those policies were extraordinarily inimical to the
public interest. And if regulated entities do not fear license revoca-
tion, then an agency's threats do little to influence the way in which
company affairs are run. The licensing power is simply too unrefined
to pose a credible threat.
The inadequacy of this type of regulatory tool was recently ex-
pressed by the first Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, who had been given the astoundingly awesome authority to
shut down the auto companies: "We had a 'nuclear deterrent': putting
M Some of these ideas were set forth in an earlier case comment cited at note 101, supra.
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them out of business. . . .Putting them out of business is no sanc-
tion at all.""'
C. Present Efforts to Use These Methods
1. Statutory reform
A survey of present state laws governing Blue Cross reveals that
in most states there has been little statutory change in recent years.
While a few states, including Alabama' and Illinois, 1 have recently
amended their laws to curtail provider domination of the boards of
trustees of Blue Cross plans in their states, many statutes still require
majority representation of providers on Blue Cross boards. The law
of Georgia is typical in providing that
[a]t least a majority of the directors of such [Blue Cross] corpora-
tion must be at all times directors, superintendents, or trustees of
hospitals, as herein defined, which have contracted or may contract
with such [Blue Cross] corporation to render its subscribers hospital
service."'
The number of states that empower the insurance regulator to exam-
ine the contractual relationship between Blue Cross and hospitals has
recently increased," 3 but the increase has been slight. Similarly, few
states have acted by statute to remove tax-exempt status from Blue
Cross organizations which have taken on the characteristics of com-
mercial insurers.14
To facilitate state adoption of more effective statutes governing
Blue Cross, the Health Law Project of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School has prepared a Model Consumer Blue Cross Statute,,"
which has received consideration from several state insurance depart-
ments. This model statute articulates the role of Blue Cross as agent
and advocate of its subscribers and specifies a number of practices
and procedures for Blue Cross to adopt to improve its performance
in this role.
The model act provides, first, that a Blue Cross board of direc-
' Remarks of William Ruckelshaus, Yale University School of Law, New Haven, Conn.,
Nov. 21, 1973.
110 ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 306, as amended, (1973).
"' ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 554, as amended, (1973).
2 GA. CODE § 56-1709 (1971).
SOHIo REV. CODE § 1739.051, as amended (1971); FLA. STAT. § 641.03; ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 32, § 555, as amended (1973).
151 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 316, as amended (1969).
Im Model Consumer Blue Cross Statute, drafted by Andreas Schneider, on file at Health
Law Project, University. of Pennsylvania Law School.
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tors or trustees will be composed entirely of subscribers, who -shall
be elected by subscribers on an annual basis and who shall represent
the demographic characteristics of the subscriber population as a
whole. This subscriber board is empowered to obtain technical advice
from a provider advisory panel. Second, the determination of whether
a rate increase should be granted to Blue Cross is made to depend in
large measure on whether Blue Cross has made a vigorous, good faith
effort to control the rates it pays to hospitals. Third, no approval of
a subscriber contract or an amendment thereto may be obtained
without opportunity for comment by subscribers. In the same vein,
the model statute provides that no rate increases can be granted
without opportunity for public comment and a public hearing.
Fourth, the act calls for careful scrutiny by the insurance department
of reimbursement contracts between Blue Cross and hospitals, with
particular attention to cost control devices contained in the contract.
Fifth, an insurance department is given the clear right to be present
at semi-annual negotiations between hospitals and Blue Cross on the
subject of reimbursement rates, and a transcript of the negotiations
must be kept.
These and other provisions of the Model Consumer Blue Cross
Statute offer a number of courses of action designed to make Blue
Cross more responsive to subscriber needs and to eliminate the infla-
tionary tendencies of its present contractual relationship with mem-
ber hospitals.
2. Quasi-legislative rule-making
The administrative procedure acts of at least some states give a
state department of insurance the authority to make formal rules
applicable to the nonprofit health insurance industry. As noted
above, 5 apparently only the Ohio Department of Insurance has cho-
sen to regulate Blue Cross through formal rules promulgated pur-
suant to the state's administrative procedure act. The Ohio rules,'5 7
like the Model Consumer Blue Cross Statute, focus on the relation-
ship between Blue Cross plans and their member-hospitals. By man-
dating the inclusion of some terms in the reimbursement contract and
by setting up guidelines governing the periodic renegotiation of that
contract, these rules attempt to build into the contractual relationship
between Blue Cross and the hospitals a strong scheme of cost control.
Under the Ohio rules, Blue Cross is prohibited from reimbursing
" See note 93 supra.
' Rule IN-1739-01, drafted by Insurance Department staff members Michael Schonbrun
and William Shkurti, effective Oct. 1, 1974 (on file with Ohio Department of Insurance).
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member hospitals for construction of facilities or purchase of equip-
ment not deemed necessary by regional planning authorities. Simi-
larly, where existing services or facilities of Blue Cross member-
hospitals are deemed duplicative or unnecessary by regional planning
authorities, the rules require Blue Cross to bargain in good faith with
member-hospitals toward consolidating or phasing out the redundant
services or facilities.
The rules also require that the board of trustees and every com-
mittee of the plan have a two-thirds consumer majority, which should
reflect the demographic characteristics of the plan's subscribers. Fi-
nally on this subject, the rules provide for exclusion of all of a plan's
present trustees from selection of future trustees.
On the topic. of financial management of a plan, the rules provide
that Blue Cross must bargain in good faith with member-hospitals
toward the latter's adoption of cost-conscious purchasing practices
and use of presently available management information systems and
industrial engineering services. The rules also set a two-month limit
on a plan's contingency reserves and provide for the return to subscri-
bers of excess reserves. To create an additional check on expenditures
by hospitals, the rules provide, first, that after having been hospital-
ized such subscriber shall get a clear, comprehensive and specific bill
from the hospital and, second, that the subscriber and the plan will
be held harmless from medical expenses adjudged unnecessary by a
recognized group which reviews utilization of hospital services. The
rules also provide for disclosure of a hospital's salary or fee expendi-
tures for ancillary specialists such as anesthesiologists, radiologists,
and pathologists and of a hospital's expenditures related to promo-
tional, lobbying, or public relations activities.
These Ohio rules, which became effective on October 1, 1974,
set forth some of the regulatory possibilities available under the ad-
ministrative rule-making powers given to state agencies by state ad-
ministration procedure acts.
3. Rule-making by adjudication
Rule-making by adjudication has been used by a number of state
departments of insurance including those of Pennsylvania, Ohio,
West Virginia, New Hampshire, and Michigan. The New Hampshire
supreme court affirmed that rule-making by adjudication is an ac-
ceptable means of regulation of the health insurance industry; in West
Virginia a county court stated that such a procedure was unauthor-
ized for agency use; in Ohio an appellate court has found the proce-
dure unacceptable; and in Michigan and Pennsylvania the procedure
has not yet been tested in the courts. In addition, in New York a court
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in dictum admonished the state insurance department for not using
rule-making by adjudication.
A 1958 Pennsylvania adjudication antedates similar efforts in
other states by a dozen years. The insurance commissioner denied a
rate increase to Philadelphia Blue Cross, at the same time issuing an
order to Blue Cross containing eight directives on how it should
discourage inefficiency and unnecessary costs in the operation of its
member hospitals.158 The directives included various types of vigi-
lance over hospital practices and threatened disapproval of future
reimbursement contracts with Blue Cross member hospitals that did
not put into effect certain cost-saving practices. One commentator
called the adjudication a "backdoor" type of regulation of hospi-
tals.'59 The adjudication was apparently never appealed to the courts.
The Commissioner's actions were an ideal example of rule promulga-
tion in rate-making adjudications on topics only indirectly related to
apparent fiscal need of the regulatee.
More recently, the Pennsylvania Commissioner of Insurance,
Herbert Denenberg, chose a procedure somewhat between rule-
making by adjudication and formal rule-making. Denenberg, the na-
tion's best-known insurance regulator, issued a series of sixty-two
guidelines proposed for inclusion in Blue Cross hospital contracts. 60
In so doing, Denenberg aided a rather unusual Blue Cross associa-
tion, Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, which has engaged in no-
holds-barred bargaining with its member-hospitals.'
In Thaler v. Stern,"2 a New York case, discussed at length
above, the court in effect lectured the insurance department for not
developing cost-control rules in its rate-making adjudications. How-
ever, since the court also found that the particular rate increase
granted by the department was necessary to the continued solvency
of Blue Cross, it affirmed the insurance department's order.
Before adopting formal rules applicable to all Blue Cross organi-
zations in his state, the Ohio superintendent of insurance used rule-
making by adjudication in hearings on rate increase applications of
specific Blue Cross organizations. Between 1971 and 1973, the super-
Im Adjudication of Francis R. Smith, Commissioner, In re Associated Hospital Service
(April 15, 1958). The adjudication is apparently unreported. It was discussed by several com-
mentators; see, e.g., Simpson, Non-Profit Hospital Service Plans, 8 CLEV.-MAR. L.REv. 492,
499-500 (1959), and Starkweather, Part 1, supra note 60, at 348-49.
"I Starkweather, Part I, supra note 60, at 349.
' H. DENENBERG, GUIDELINES FOR INCLUSION IN BLUE CROSS CONTRACT WITH DELA-
WARE VALLEY HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION AND RESPONSE OF BLUE CROSS (1973).
161 NHI REPORTS 9 (1973).
"6 44 Misc. 2d 278, 253 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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intendent denied the rate increase applications of four Blue Cross
organizations after lengthy hearings. Ohio law requires that a Blue
Cross rate increase be "fair, lawful, and reasonable.' ' 3 In each case
the superintendent held that due .to certain practices of Blue Cross
the granting of a rate increase would be "other than fair, lawful, and
reasonable." In particular, the rate increase was determined to be
contrary to the statute because Blue Cross had allegedly "failed to
exert any effective influence over its member hospitals to operate
more efficiently."' 64
The Ohio superintendent of insurance's use of rule-making by
adjudication thus far has not fared well in Ohio courts. All four
adjudications were appealed by Blue Cross. One of the appeals is still
pending. In the remaining three appeals the superintendent's use of
rule-making by adjudication was struck down.
In one case, In re Application of Blue Cross of Northwest Ohio
(1973), 165 the court of appeals affirmed the lower court which had
upheld the superintendent's order on the grounds that the rate in-
crease was "other than lawful, fair, and reasonable," but it stated in
unequivocal language that the superintendent could not use rule-
making by adjudication, adding that it did not believe Chenery III's
to be good law in Ohio.6 7
The other two appeals from the superintendent's orders resulted
in the orders being overturned, on the ground that the superintendent
had no authority to promlgate retrospective rules in the adjudica-
tion."'
The use of rule-ma ing by adjudication in Blue Cross rate-
making hearings to contrl hospital costs is, at this point, also unac-
ceptable in West Virginia. In a 1972 hearing, Commissioner Weese
of the West Virginia department of insurance denied a rate increase
to Blue Cross on the ground that Blue Cross did not attempt to
control hospital costs on behalf of its subscribers.'69 The commis-
sioner was authorized to approve rates which were "not excessive,
" Omo REv. CODE § 1739.051 (1971).
IS, See the following hearings on file with the Ohio Department of Insurance: Blue Cross
of Central Ohio, Blue Cross of Northwest Ohio, Blue Cross of Canton, Ohio and Blue Cross
of Lima, Ohio.
' 40 Ohio App. 2d 285 (Franklin Co. C.P. 1973).
332 U.S. 194 (1947).
267 In re Application of Blue Cross (1973), supra note 165, at 291-92.
1 In re Application of Blue Cross, 34 Ohio Misc. 29 (Franklin Co. C.P. 1972). In re-Blue
Cross of Canton, Ohio, Case No. 73CV-01-146 (C.P. 1973), aff'd, Ct. App. Franklin Co., Case
No. 73-AP-497 (Aug. 27, 1974) (now under appeal to Ohio supreme court).




inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory."' 70 The commissioner found
that there was a lack of "arm's length negotiations" between Blue
Cross and its member-hospitals, and that the "reimbursement con-
tract . . . [was] unfavorable to Blue Cross subscribers.' 17' The com-
missioner determined that he had authority to inquire into the reason-
ableness of the reimbursement contract between Blue Cross and the
hospitals and denied the rate increase because the reimbursement
contract was deemed unreasonable.
On appeal, the commissioner's order was overturned. 172 The
court held that hospital rates and the reimbursement contract be-
tween Blue Cross and the hospitals could not be corrected via rule-
making by adjudication, citing In re Application of Blue Cross of
Central Ohio (1972). 73 The court noted there are "other means of
correcting the [Blue Cross] abuses," ''7 although it did not indicate
what those "other means" were.
The New Hampshire supreme court has unanimously stated that
rule-making by adjudication may be utilized in rate-making hearings
for a nonprofit health insurance company in order to improve health
care services to subscribers. 75
In 1972 Commissioner Durkin of the New Hampshire depart-
ment of insurance ordered a rate-making hearing on the state's Blue
Shield organization. In May, 1973, the commissioner ordered a de-
crease in Blue Shield rates on the ground that its contingency reserve
was too high. The commissioner ordered an upgrading of services to
subscribers, including broader coverage and an elimination of distinc-
tions in coverage and rates between group and nongroup subscribers
and made several recommendations, including the merger of Blue
Shield and Blue Cross and reconstituting of the membership of the
board to reflect the demographic characteristics of the subscribers.,76
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the commis-
sioner had the authority to do all that he did.'77 First, the court citing
Chenery II as authority7 ' upheld rule-making by adjudication in a
W.VA.CODE. § 33-24-6(c) (1972).
"' Supra note 169, at 9-10.
17 Rate Filing of Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc., Civil Action No. 11,956 and Civil
Action No. 12,054 (Cir.Ct.W.Va. 1973).
I" Supra note 168.
17' Supra note 172, at 9.
175 New Hampshire-Vermont Physician Service v. Durkin, - N.H. , 313 A.2d 416
(per Kenison, C.J.) (1973).
171 Id. at ----- , 313 A.2d at 418.
177 Id. at , 313 A.2d at 419-21.
7' Id. at , 313 A.2d at 420.
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rate-making hearing as a valid means to regulate Blue Shield.179 The
court then stated that the commissioner indirectly had the authority
to regulate the service provided by the health insurance company:
[a] necessary concomitant to the commissioner's authority to find
rates "inadequate or discriminatory" would be the ability to estab-
lish the minimum level of services offered by the corporations for
the protection of subscribers.'
However, the court remanded the case to the commissioner be-
cause it found that the record could not reasonably support any of
his findings.' The recommendations were not dealt with because
they were not legally binding.'
In April 1974 Michigan Commissioner of Insurance Demlow
made the following conclusions from a Blue Cross rate-making hear-
ing: Blue Cross' use of a retrospective rather than a prospective reim-
bursement formula caused higher rates to subscribers; Blue Cross was
failing to eliminate wasteful health care delivery practices such as
overbedding; and Blue Cross was spending too much on advertis-
ing."8 The commissioner therefore denied the rate increase and pro-
mulgated some rules. The rules provided that Blue Cross should use
prospective reimbursement more frequently and that it should begin
to eliminate wasteful health care delivery practices. Moreover, Blue
Cross was to submit all advertisements to the insurance bureau for
prior approval. Failure to comply with any of those orders would
result in denial of future rate increases." 4
III. CONCLUSION
Responsibility for regulation of health insurance generally and
of Blue Cross in particular has been committed to state insurance
departments during the entire period of the health care crisis men-
tioned throughout this article. In states where the regulators have had
the will, presently exising statutes have provided an adequate starting
point for regulation. Unfortunately, as pointed out earlier, the overall
record by state regulators indicates lethargy. Yet the recent activity
by some state insurance departments suggests that a prediction made
four years ago may soon be a reality:
17 Id.
180 Id. at....., 313 A.2d at 421.
M Id. at 313 A.2d at 421-22.
M Id. at 313 A.2d at 422.
'8 In re 1974 Rate Review of Michigan Hospital Service, Daniel Demlow, Insurance
Commissioner, April 29, 1974, cited supra note 94.
I There has yet to be an appeal.
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[T]here is the likelihood of expanded efforts on the part of insurance
comissioners to control hospital and physician costs, using insur-
ance regulations as the indirect mechanism. . . . Since insurance
increases the demand for medical services, it is appropriate that
public concern over increased use takes the form of insurance com-
missioner activity.'1
With the rapid approach of national health insurance and the near
certainty of the continued use of the nonprofit health insurance indus-
try as an integral part of the operation of the nation's health care
delivery system, it is to be hoped that the states use and expand their
regulatory powers in a way that will prevent the defects in the present
system from contaminating national health insurance.
"I Starkweather, Part II, supra note 96, at 487.
Though the major repository of power to regulate the nonprofit health insurance industry
is the insurance departments of the several states, recent developments indicate some potential
for direct citizen influence on the regulatory process. Private citizens have sometimes acted to
bypass state insurance departments and, with varying degrees of success, have intervened in
and/or appealed from rate adjudications by state insurance departments. Thaler v. Stern, supra
note 126. In some places, antitrust actions have been filed. Borland v. Bayonne Hospital, supra
note 53. In other areas, citizens are making use of openings on Blue Cross boards of trustees
created by amendments in the statutes. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 1739.04 (1972). Direct
citizen action is potentially a viable alternative to state regulation, but there is currently very
little activity in the area, and, consequently, very little law has developed.
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